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JOHN MOORE JR.:  MOORE V. CITY OF EAST 
CLEVELAND AND CHILDREN’S 
CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS 
Nancy E. Dowd* 
INTRODUCTION 
At the heart of Moore v. City of East Cleveland1 is seven-year-old John 
Moore Jr.  When his grandmother tried to register John Jr. for school, the 
school attempted to exclude him by invoking a rule requiring that his 
grandmother be his legal guardian in order to register him.  When that effort 
failed, the city, in a move that seems hardly coincidental, inspected his 
grandmother’s house and determined John Jr.’s presence violated its zoning 
ordinance and ordered his removal.2  Had his grandmother complied, she 
would no longer have been able to register him for school.  How would we 
tell the story of John Jr. from his perspective, and how might we construct 
the case if his constitutional rights were asserted?  In this Article, I first tell 
the story of the case from John Jr.’s perspective and then construct 
constitutional claims on his behalf. 
John Jr.’s potential claims are not simply a matter of historical curiosity. 
Rather, considering his perspective suggests a potential strategy to confront 
racial, gender, and class inequalities among children today.  Some of these 
inequalities require dismantling barriers that existing policies or practices put 
in children’s way, making children’s development and growth more 
difficult.3  Other inequalities are linked to state support that favors some 
identifiable groups of children over others.4 
* Professor and David Levin Chair in Family Law, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin
College of Law.  My thanks to Robin Lenhardt and Clare Huntington, who organized the
Fordham Law Review Family Law Symposium entitled Moore Kinship held at Fordham
University School of Law, the students of the Fordham Law Review, and the participants,
whose lively and questioning dialogue deeply affected my thinking for this Article.  For an
overview of the symposium, see R.A. Lenhardt & Clare Huntington, Foreword:  Moore
Kinship, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2551 (2017).
1. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
2. Robin A. Lenhardt, Professor, Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, Presentation at the
Fordham Law Review Family Law Symposium:  Moore Kinship (Oct. 14, 2016). 
3. See generally PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE:  URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE 
END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY (2013) (explaining that poverty and housing 
policies reproduce disadvantage intergenerationally). 
4. See generally GARY ORFIELD & JOHN T. YUN, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., 
RESEGREGATION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS (1999), https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/ 
research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/resegregation-in-american-schools/orfiled-
resegregation-in-american-schools-1999.pdf (explaining that schools vary according to the 
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Children can make unique claims against the state; thus, children’s 
constitutional arguments might include claims of positive rights to the 
necessary supports to achieve their developmental potential and maximize 
their opportunity.5  Children’s positive rights are inescapably linked to their 
equality:  all children must have developmental support to achieve their 
developmental capacity and become productive citizens.  Because children 
are embedded in families, neighborhoods, and communities, the 
developmental support of children means essential attention to the policies, 
institutions, and structures that support the elements of their ecology ensure 
the individual life course of every child and the equality among all children. 
In sum, children’s perspectives and interests are essential to advance the 
equality of all children and all families.6 
To develop protections for children’s rights and needs we must ask, “What 
about the child’s perspective?” rather than subsume their interests in concepts 
of “family” or “parent.”7  The child’s perspective must be both individual 
and responsive to children’s identities (individual and group).8  The inquiry 
must include whether there are insufficiencies in the degree of support among 
children that reproduce inequalities.  Because patterns of inequality persist 
along race, gender, and class lines, it is critical that the child’s perspective is 
raced and gendered to avoid continuing subordination in the name of 
universality.9  Children’s rights therefore necessarily involve the intersection 
of their fundamental rights and their equality rights. 
This Article is divided into three parts.  First, I retell the story of Moore 
from John Jr.’s perspective and frame his potential claims.  Second, I explore 
constitutional arguments under existing doctrine, using contemporary equal 
protection and substantive due process analyses.  Finally, I suggest how a 
children’s rights perspective might be even more persuasive as a strategy for 
John Jr., as well as for achieving opportunity and equality on behalf of 
contemporary children living amid and affected by structural inequalities that 
impact their developmental capacity. 
wealth of the school districts. which mirror racially resegregated housing patterns) 
[https://perma.cc/XDF6-BVVH]. 
5. For an example of this perspective, see G.A. Res. 44/25, Convention on the Rights of
the Child (Nov. 20, 1989), infra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child), and see also infra Part III (discussing children’s positive rights). 
6. For similar perspectives, see generally MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE:
FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT AND AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS (2010); CLARE HUNTINGTON,
FAILURE TO FLOURISH:  HOW THE LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS (2014). 
7. The U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has strongly protected parents and families
on the assumption that they will act in the best interests of their children and should be given 
deference in the care of children. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 58 (2000). 
8. See Nancy E. Dowd, Unfinished Equality:  The Case of Black Boys, 2 IND. J.L. & SOC.
EQUALITY 36, 38–40 (2013). 
9. See Nancy E. Dowd, Black Boys Matter:  Developmental Equality, 45 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 47, 114–15 (2016). 
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I.  JOHN JR.’S PERSPECTIVE:  RETELLING THE STORY 
OF MOORE V. CITY OF EAST CLEVELAND 
John Jr. went to live with his grandmother, Inez Moore, in East Cleveland 
in the late 1960s after his mother died.10  He was less than one year old when 
he moved in with his grandmother.11  Many details about Inez Moore are 
unknown, but it does not seem unusual, given the gendered norms of the day, 
that John Jr.’s father would have turned to his own mother for help.  The 
death of John Jr.’s mother left a vacuum of maternal care—the expected 
source of care for children—a gap filled by John Jr.’s grandmother.12  John 
Jr.’s father also occasionally lived with him and his grandmother during the 
time between the death of John Jr.’s mother and John Jr.’s entry into school.13  
Eventually, however, John Jr.’s father remarried and, with his new wife, 
moved into another house that John Jr.’s grandmother owned.14  Remaining 
with his grandmother might have been based on the stability and continuity 
that arrangement provided, the bonds between John Jr. and his grandmother, 
or the desire to solidify John Sr.’s new marriage.  It might have reflected the 
strength of John Jr.’s other family ties in his grandmother’s house.  John Jr.’s 
cousin, Dale Jr., who was four years younger than John Jr., was raised with 
him as if they were brothers.15  Dale Jr.’s father, Dale Sr., also lived in the 
household.  So, again, in the gendered norms of the times, John Jr. had a 
father figure in his household, his uncle, as well as the regular presence of 
his father.  John Jr. also had the benefit of a large group of cousins, twenty-
one in all.16  His grandmother’s house was a two-family structure, and some 
of his cousins lived next door in the other half of the house.17  Thus, John Jr. 
had a stable, embedded set of family ties in a robust extended family.  This 
family was a critical resource to him when countering the adverse effects of 
losing his mother at such a young age.18 
John Jr.’s life, however, intersected with legal structures intended to 
manage and control East Cleveland by race and class when he began school:  
those structures would converge on this seven-year-old because of his 
 
 10. See Peggy Cooper Davis, Moore v. East Cleveland:  Constructing the Suburban 
Family, in FAMILY LAW STORIES 77, 77–78 (Carol Sanger ed., 2008); see also Kerry Abrams, 
Family History:  Inside and Out, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1010 (2013). 
 11. See Abrams, supra, note 10, at 1010. 
 12. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 n.2 (1977) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (referring to the essential “maternal influence” that John Jr. received from his 
grandmother after his mother’s death); see also id. at 505 n.16 (plurality opinion) (referring to 
John Jr.’s grandmother’s care as a “substitute for his mother’s . . . establish[ing] a more normal 
home environment”). 
 13. Davis, supra note 10, at 78. 
 14. Lenhardt, supra note 2. 
 15. Moore, 431 U.S. at 506 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring) (characterizing their relationship 
as a sibling relationship). 
 16. See Davis, supra note 10, at 78. 
 17. See id. But see Lenhardt supra note 2 (noting that this is not certain; it was not 
necessarily her daughter and a son, but might have been another family member). 
 18. The adverse-childhood-experiences framework counts the death of a parent as an 
adverse factor.  On adverse childhood experiences generally, see Adverse Childhood 
Experiences (ACEs), CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ 
violenceprevention/acestudy (last visited Apr. 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/T5JE-PFYB]. 
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identity as a black boy in a low-income family.  Segregation, structurally 
supported by law, limited the places where John Jr. might have lived had he 
been born earlier; but, by the time he was born in the 1960s, East Cleveland 
was integrating.19  There were efforts to “manage” and resist integration and 
to prevent white flight that were both race and class focused through the use 
of zoning and housing codes.20  In addition, schools were the primary 
structure for managing the process of racial change.21  It was Inez Moore’s 
actions to register John Jr. for school that triggered the Moore litigation. 
When Inez Moore tried to register her grandson for school in 1972, she 
was told she could not do so because she lacked formal legal guardianship of 
John Jr.22  This must have seemed ridiculous to the person who had parented 
John Jr. since he was an infant and was his primary caretaker.  Inez Moore 
was his functional mother and the head of her extended family.  The 
guardianship requirement may have been an effort to stem the number of 
black children entering the school system, particularly low-income black 
children, who were disproportionately more likely to live in a household 
other their parents’ household.  Inez Moore decided to fight this policy and 
went to Legal Aid.23  Legal Aid brought a class action on behalf of families 
similarly situated, and the school board settled by eliminating the 
guardianship requirement.24 
But this victory appears to have triggered a retaliatory effort by placing 
Inez Moore on the city’s radar.  Shortly after the settlement on the 
guardianship issue, housing code inspectors appeared at her door on January 
13, 1973.25  John Jr. allegedly was “illegally” in her home and would have to 
be removed, which would also mean he could not be registered for school.26  
It seems too coincidental to think this investigation was accidental.  A year 
after the initiation of the investigation, in January 1974, Inez Moore was cited 
in a criminal complaint and ordered to remove John Jr. from her home within 
ten days or face jail time and a fine.27  Expelling a family member from her 
home would likely have been unthinkable as well as enraging. 
Legal Aid again represented Inez Moore, beginning the lawsuit that would 
take more than three years to reach resolution.  On May 31, 1977, which 
would have been near the end of the school year, when John Jr. was eleven 
years old, the U.S. Supreme Court in Moore declared the housing code 
 
 19. See Lenhardt, supra note 2.  In Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the Court held 
that restrictive racial covenants are unconstitutional. 
 20. See Lenhardt, supra note 2. 
 21. The Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was 
followed by decades of resistance in the North and South, followed by de facto resegregation.  
For the complex history of resistance to school integration, see Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District 1, 551 U.S. 701, 805–19 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 22. See Lenhardt, supra note 2. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See id.; see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 533 (1977) (Stewart, 
J., dissenting). 
 26. As noted in the Moore plurality opinion, the citation issued in 1973 stated that “John 
[Jr.] was an ‘illegal occupant.’” Moore, 431 U.S. at 497 (plurality opinion). 
 27. See id. 
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provision unconstitutional.28  John Jr. was allowed to remain in his home, 
with his family, and stay in school.  He was probably old enough during much 
of this period to understand what might happen to him if the Supreme Court 
did not overrule the Ohio courts’ negative decisions. 
II.  JOHN JR.’S CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS 
Moore was brought, and won, by John Jr.’s grandmother, Inez Moore.  
What if the lawsuit had been brought on behalf of John Jr.?  How would we 
define and construct his interests, and the harms he would suffer, if he was 
forced out of his grandmother’s house and then forced to change schools?  
Could a claim be brought based on the harm of losing his functional sibling 
relationship with Dale Jr., in addition to his relationships with his 
grandmother and uncle?  What impact would his removal have had on the 
other grandchildren and on children in the neighborhood and the community 
who would witness the power of the state being used to remove a seven-year-
old from his home and school? 
John Jr.’s story suggests systemic links between housing regulation and 
the education system.  Did these policies have a disproportionate impact?  
The housing ordinance was generated and targeted at regulating integration 
by African Americans and discouraging white flight as the racial balance 
changed in East Cleveland.29  Did the brunt of those efforts fall on black 
children who, like John Jr., might not only be forced to move but might also 
be forced to change schools?  Or on black children who were actively 
discouraged from attending schools?  Is there a systemic claim that ought to 
be brought on John Jr.’s behalf focusing on the framework of housing 
regulation as it intersects with public education? 
There are also structural links to income inequality, wealth inequality, and 
employment discrimination in this case.  Both John Jr.’s and Dale Jr.’s fathers 
were present and engaged in their sons’ lives.  In the case, both appear to be 
struggling financially and hence were dependent on their mother to house 
themselves and their sons.30  What dynamics or systems might be implicated 
in their economic difficulties that similarly intersect with housing and 
education?  In other words, do we need to ask other questions linked to 
gender, race, class, and their intersections, to determine if John Jr. is being 
targeted because of the “sins” of his father?  Patterns then and now of 
persisting employment discrimination would lead to income inequality that 
limit housing choices, even if no other factors intervene.31  The intersection 
 
 28. See id. at 499–500. 
 29. Cf. id. at 509–10 (Brennan J., concurring); Davis, supra note 10, at 82–83; Lenhardt, 
supra note 2. 
 30. Dale Sr. could only legally be in his mother’s home if he was dependent on her because 
of the terms of the housing code provision at issue in the case. Moore, 431 U.S. at 496 n.2 
(plurality opinion).  John Sr.’s economic status was less certain, but we know that he was 
occasionally part of his mother’s household and did not have a home of his own, and when he 
remarried, he was living in his mother’s other house. See id. at 497 n.4; Lenhardt, supra note 
2. 
 31. See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:  
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1998); PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN 
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with race further limits housing for both John Jr. and today’s children.32  The 
linking of housing and income with differential schools generates for the 
children of low-income parents inequality in their developmental supports.33 
John Jr.’s potential claims are powerfully and fundamentally about 
inequality:  they address being treated differently with respect to his family 
and home and the connected impact on his education.  The state’s actions 
discriminated among children on the basis of race, class, and family structure 
or form.  They infringed on his fundamental rights of family by literally 
requiring his expulsion from his family’s home.  The equal protection claims 
would rest on the state’s differentiation and discrimination among children 
based on family form, race, and class, causing harm to John Jr.’s fundamental 
rights to familial relationships and his necessary caregiving and 
developmental support, as well as disrupting his education.  Because family 
rights are fundamental, discrimination based on family form arguably results 
in heightened scrutiny of the state’s action.34  Similarly, a race discrimination 
claim, grounded in the evidence of the racial purpose of the housing code 
provision and its racial impact on schools, would entitle John Jr. to strict 
scrutiny.35  His class claim would at best merit heightened rational basis 
scrutiny.36 
Another constitutional theory would be infringement of fundamental rights 
protected by substantive due process—an intersectional and related claim to 
the equality arguments—for intrusion and destructive impact on his family 
relationships with his grandmother, cousin, and uncle.  Here, John Jr. would 
be articulating a related claim to the one made by his grandmother:  his rights 
to the continued familial relationships in his grandmother’s household, which 
constituted his “family.”  He might make the developmental argument of the 
importance of such relationships to his well-being and growth.  Because he 
had lost a parent, John Jr. might also argue for the importance of functional 
relationships rather than simply those connected to formal parental status, as 
well as the importance of the sustained sibling relationship with Dale Jr.  In 
addition to these familial and developmental claims, John Jr. might further 
claim that the threatened disruption of his education violates his ability to 
learn and his right to educational support.37 
These claims would face significant doctrinal barriers.  In the absence of 
discriminatory intent, structural claims are disfavored under the Equal 
Protection Clause as a result of Washington v. Davis.38  Its limitation on 
structural claims has only strengthened over time, leaving in place for 
disparate impact claims only those that meet the limits set forth in Yick Wo v. 
 
PLACE:  URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY 
(2013). 
 32. See generally SHARKEY, supra note 31. 
 33. See Dowd, supra note 9, at 67. 
 34. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
 35. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
 36. See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 457–62 (1988); Dandridge 
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970). 
 37. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215 (1982). 
 38. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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Hopkins.39  Under Yick Wo, discriminatory intent may be read from a 
disproportionate racial pattern only if there is no other explanation for the 
pattern.40  The requirement of intentional discrimination in virtually all cases, 
moreover, has been interpreted as a strong standard of intent:  a plaintiff must 
show that decisions with disproportionate effects were chosen because of 
those effects.41  The evidence of such intent might have been sufficient in 
Moore given the explicit racial considerations underlying the adoption of 
these policies.42  For contemporary children facing structural inequalities, 
discriminatory intent is less likely to be present.  While there is evidence that 
state actions have disparate racial impact (and class impact) especially with 
respect to education (achievement and discipline, in particular, and the 
known differentials in the quality of schools), rarely are the likely racial 
impacts of a policy specifically articulated as the reason to adopt that 
policy.43 
Several strategies might improve the possibility of contemporary equal 
protection claims, but they would require changes to equal protection 
doctrine.  First, the concept of intent could be expanded to incorporate the 
robust scholarship on implicit cognitive bias and stereotyping to reframe the 
definition of intent or to add a concept of reckless discrimination (similar to 
tort standards that treat recklessness as equivalent to intent).44  Second, 
disparate impact analysis could be embraced as reflecting contemporary 
understandings of how discrimination functions, which is essential to achieve 
the constitutional design and meaning of equality.  In essence, this would 
require either loosening the strictures of Yick Wo or revisiting Davis.  Third, 
the doctrine could disavow the principle of color blindness, which so often 
has only reinforced white privilege, in favor of embracing color 
consciousness and the value of racial diversity as the hallmarks of equality.45 
Such a constitutional strategy seems daunting, which may counsel against 
it.  But, it may be useful to remind ourselves that alternative constitutional 
interpretations that recognize precisely such interpretations of equal 
protection exist in robust constitutional dissents that outline a very different 
 
 39. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 40. See id. at 373–74. 
 41. See Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 277 (1979). 
 42. See Lenhardt, supra note 2. 
 43. The complexity of the factors creating the pattern is such that it is also unlikely that 
such a case would meet Yick Wo standards unless a plaintiff demonstrates intersecting 
embedded mutually reinforcing segregated systems linked to state action. 
 44. On implicit bias, see generally Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1489 (2005), and Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures:  A Behavioral Realist 
Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063 (2006).  On reckless discrimination, 
see Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). 
 45. See, e.g., Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The 
white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.  And so it is, in prestige, in 
achievements, in education, in wealth and in power.  So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for 
all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional 
liberty.  But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no 
superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens.  There is no caste here.  Our Constitution is color-
blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”). 
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constitutional conception of equality.46  In addition, it might be argued that 
Obergefell v. Hodges47 suggests the possibility of a doctrinal opening to such 
reframed analysis.48  Reframed equality analysis could bring a vast range of 
law and policy under scrutiny.49  It might be argued that, indeed, it is time 
for exactly that to happen and to start with cases addressing children and 
youth. 
Alternatively, some of John Jr.’s claims might be framed as fundamental 
rights claims under substantive due process.  Today, the existence of Moore 
provides greater potential protection to a range of family forms, although 
Moore is certainly capable of being read narrowly.50  If children have, in 
essence, the mirror image of their parents’ and families’ constitutional 
protection, then for a child today, such a claim would be fairly unremarkable.  
To the extent their claims are distinctive, it would expand and make more 
robust the scope of familial constitutional rights.  Other potential claims (e.g., 
sibling rights and functional relationships) would face an uphill climb to 
recognition, given the persistent resistance to expanding the scope of 
fundamental rights.  In addition, no fundamental rights claim would exist for 
disruption of John Jr.’s education without revisiting the Court’s position that 
education is not a fundamental right.51  Finally, just as class arguments carry 
no particularly heightened standard of review under the Equal Protection 
Clause, so too under existing doctrine there is no fundamental right to even a 
basic survival level of economic support.52 
An alternative to recasting or challenging equal protection and 
fundamental rights analysis may be to bypass that difficult path altogether by 
using a children’s rights argument incorporating specific substantive 
 
 46. See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2632–52 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 803–68 
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 528–62 
(1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 320–45 (1987) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting); Feeney, 442 U.S. at 281–88 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265, 387–402 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 
256–71 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 231–40 (1971) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 761–62 (1966) (Clark, J., 
concurring); id. at 774–86 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Korematsu 
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233–42 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting); id. at 242–48 (Jackson, 
J., dissenting); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26–62 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting); 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 83–111 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting). 
 47. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 48. See id. at 2611 (Roberts, J., dissenting); id. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 49. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248 (“A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is 
nevertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one 
race more than another would be far reaching and would raise serious questions about, and 
perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing 
statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more 
affluent white.”). 
 50. While the case can be read broadly to support functional families and nontraditional 
families, it could also be limited to extended families that look only like the one headed by 
Inez Moore, that is families with blood ties. 
 51. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). 
 52. See supra note 36. 
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guarantees connected to children’s development and equality of those 
developmental rights.  I explore this possibility in the following part. 
III.  CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 
Children’s rights doctrine is largely uncharted and undeveloped territory 
in constitutional law, but that very nebulousness, combined with threads of 
recognition of such a doctrine, including some sensitivity to developmental 
factors, may suggest room for doctrinal development.53  This would mean 
not only protecting children from the inadequacies and inequalities of state 
policies and institutions but also giving them claims that recognize their 
positive rights.54  Equality for children, and their special dependency on the 
systems of society to achieve their developmental potential, arguably 
generates such obligations.  It is their developmental needs that are my focus 
here. 
The theoretical grounding for children’s rights is in recognizing children’s 
inevitable dependency and needs; children’s vulnerability, in a positive and 
negative sense; the social value of investing in children as future citizens, 
building their human capital; the moral argument of value of children as 
human beings who cannot flourish without support; and a human rights 
argument grounded in their special position because of their dependency and 
potential.  The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(UNCRC), although not adopted by the United States, is nevertheless a useful 
starting point to think broadly about children’s rights.55  The four key 
principles of the UNCRC are the best interests of the child;56 the right to life, 
survival, and development;57 the right to equality or nondiscrimination;58 and 
respect for the voice and empowerment of children.59  These principles 
 
 53. For example, the recognition of developmental principles in a range of cases is one of 
those threads. See generally BARBARA BENNETT WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT:  THE 
TRAGEDY OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN TO LIONEL TATE (2008); Anne 
Dailey, Children’s Constitutional Rights, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2099 (2011). 
 54. This is likely to generate resistance as well, given the view by many that our 
Constitution only provides negative rights. See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 
U.S. 748, 755 (2005); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 
(1989). 
 55. See generally Nancy E. Dowd, A Developmental Equality Model for the Best Interests 
of Children, in IMPLEMENTING ARTICLE 3 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS 
OF THE CHILD 112–30 (Elaine E. Sutherland & Lesley-Anne Barness Macfarlane eds., 2016).  
The United States is the only nation that has not ratified the UNCRC, but a coalition of 
sponsors has suggested a U.S. Children’s Bill of Rights that closely follows the principles of 
the UNCRC. See Press Release, First Focus Campaign for Children, 120+ Advocacy Groups 
Endorse Children’s Bill of Rights (Oct. 28, 2015), https://campaignforchildren.org/news/ 
press-release/120-advocacy-groups-endorse-childrens-bill-of-rights/ [https://perma.cc/2ND 
H-4275]; see also FIRST FOCUS CAMPAIGN FOR CHILD., http://campaignforchildren.org (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/H42U-JAVR].  Also essential would be overruling 
Rodriguez.  Education as a fundamental right is clearly suggested by the language in Brown 
and Plyler.  This might open the door to establishing other foundational children’s rights in 
the poverty, child welfare, and juvenile justice systems. 
 56. G.A. Res. 44/25, supra note 5, art. 3. 
 57. Id. arts. 5–6. 
 58. Id. art. 2. 
 59. Id. art. 5. 
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encompass the notion of the state’s positive obligations to children and where 
those obligations lie.  I focus here on the intersection between developmental 
rights and equality rights.  Children should be entitled to developmental 
equality.60 
Children’s rights doctrine combines positive rights with developmental 
support and equality rights to ensure that every child is supported to his or 
her greatest potential.61  Indeed, it is critical that the “child” that is the focus 
of children’s rights not be conceptualized neutrally, without gender, race, or 
class, as those identity characteristics are strong developmental factors as 
well as equality factors.62  Developmental rights might include, but not be 
limited to, the protection and support of family bonds; family support, 
ensuring economic sufficiency and that economic differences do not translate 
into developmental differences; developmental supports geared to 
developmental ages and stages (e.g., early childhood development versus 
adolescence); and institutional support for development, such as child health 
equity, educational equity, and a rehabilitative juvenile justice system 
minimally utilizing incarceration.  Connected to these developmental 
supports would be supports for families to minimize or eliminate child 
poverty and the direct and associated ills of poverty for children’s 
development.  While some might argue that positive rights should be limited 
to minimum needs, that approach would entrench inequalities by ensuring 
the likelihood of differential developmental supports depending on the 
accident of one’s birth.  To the contrary, the component factors that facilitate 
healthy development can be identified and should be provided for all 
children.  In addition, as our existing disability statutes provide, when 
children have disabilities that affect their developmental path, the state 
should provide additional support so that they might reach their 
developmental potential.63  Structural faults should be corrected where 
systems interfere with children’s developmental rights or operate to 
perpetuate race and gender inequalities. 
The case for children’s rights is grounded first in making the fundamental 
rights argument and then arguing the presence of both equal protection and 
substantive due process violations by the state’s failure to meet the standards 
implicit in children’s rights in the developmental context.  In Moore, this 
would mean not only dismantling the immediate systems causing harm—
here the housing/zoning system in combination with the school system—but 
also looking at John Jr.’s degree of support as he experienced the loss of his 
mother and the extent to which supports were available to his father, 
grandmother, family, neighborhood, and community. 
Particularly important for the argument that could be made on behalf of 
John Jr. is his right to develop to his potential, a right equal to that of other 
children without respect to identity, race, gender, or class.  For John Jr. and 
other children of color for whom identity triggers inequality in resources, 
 
 60. See generally Dowd, supra note 9. 
 61. See id. at 50. 
 62. See id. at 52. 
 63. See id. at 112 & n.369. 
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neighborhoods, family support, educational opportunity, and scrutiny by the 
police powers of the state, such arguments are particularly essential and 
strong.64  They would require not only dismantling housing and educational 
policies and institutions that fail to provide equal developmental support but 
also would aim to prevent the active developmental harm of actions like the 
demand to remove a child from his family threatened by the City of East 
Cleveland. 
For contemporary children, a positive children’s rights argument would be 
particularly helpful in providing constitutional grounding to address some of 
the most confounding issues of social justice that affect them:  child poverty; 
the disproportionate distribution of adverse childhood experiences among 
poor children; the toll on development of ongoing racism and racial 
inequality; the negative impact of surveillance, discipline, and policing; and 
the overall negative consequences of the juvenile justice and criminal justice 
systems.65  One example of this might be mandating supports to families and 
communities in early childhood to equalize readiness and opportunity at entry 
into preschool and kindergarten.  Even to the extent of supporting claims to 
remove obstacles and equalize support in existing systems (versus meeting 
the standards of positive rights), such an analysis might more fruitfully 
confront educational inequalities in achievement and discipline that 
disproportionately impact children of color. 
 The concept of children’s rights therefore provides an expanded 
mechanism to confront the inequalities that plague children and families, and 
it offers a powerful strategy to confront equality as a whole.  Supporting, even 
mandating, action by the state is essential to provide real opportunities to 
children today who face daunting intersectional structural inequalities that 
may further rigidify our persisting race and class inequalities.  Through the 
eyes of children, maybe it will be clearer to see our way forward. 
 
 64. See supra note 31. 
 65. See supra note 31; see also Dowd, supra note 9. 
